

Determining the “Gap”

**A Monograph
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Abstract

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Doctrine is under attack from within the military and by the American press. The length of the current conflict has been “perceived” as too long, and the United States Military, according to some has been too slow to adapt. Accusations of “gaps” within military doctrine have been presented as reasons for the slow adaptation. This monograph explores if whether the mechanisms in doctrine are correct, and whether gaps are present. If there are gaps in U.S. military doctrine are they detrimental to the current fight, and limit adaptation and evolution.

Using a Process Tracing Case Study methodology this research explores American Army and Joint Doctrine beginning at the formation of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and follow it through to recent releases of the new FM 3-0, 3-24, and 3-07. The brief synopsis of doctrinal history allows the reader to follow evolutionary changes to military doctrine. It also allows the reader to see how these changes are relevant today. The use of non-military theories such as Complexity Theory, and Organizational Development theory shows not only the uniqueness of military thought, but also the effectiveness of implementation of new ideas. Historical examples that explored in this monograph are General William DePuy's implementation of AirLand Battle, and the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. As the author traces historical doctrine development, a baseline for doctrine is established. This baseline is seen through the guiding doctrinal principles that have little change throughout the thirty years of evolution. These principles are what have become known as the Principles of War, or Principles of Operations.

With an established baseline, the author then looks at the current fight from the eyes of fellow officers by constructing and conducting a survey, that utilizes the convenience sampling technique. The author creates a survey from the established baseline of the Principles of War and asks officers with deployment experience how they saw their operations within Iraq and Afghanistan in a doctrinal sense. Though the results are generalized, they are limited as a random sampling technique was unviable for conducting this research in a reasonable period. The survey results produce show doctrinal gaps within the U.S. Army on how officers view the role of the military advisor, and how they see their operations in light of doctrine.

Through the course of the process trace, the author finds that there are organizational gaps between U.S. Military doctrine and Joint doctrine, but the author shows that this gap is key to allowing the military to adapt. Through use of his survey the author determines two further gaps in U.S. Army doctrine. The first is the role of the military advisor within the current conflict and the second a knowledge gap of doctrine itself. The author then analyses these results concluding that there are currently three gaps within doctrine

In the end, critical for maintaining the gap between Joint and Army doctrine is critical to maintain as it allows for adaptation and evolution of the organization. The gaps within U.S. Army doctrine must be furthered explored, but initial recommendations show that there is a baseline within doctrine for the military advisor by following U.S. Army training doctrine, and by adjusting the curriculum of the officer core in order to close the knowledge gap.

The author closes by concluding that doctrine is current, viable, and in the hands of the military professional to be kept current. Young officers must be taught that doctrine serves as the guide and common language within the military and that it can be changed using the mechanisms in place.

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Introduction

Modern joint and Army Doctrine are under attack. Those attacking current doctrine feel that the current war is not being executed properly, and military leaders do not have the tools or guiding principles in order to properly execute the necessary missions. Those that argue against doctrine point to innovations in the field and state they are non-doctrinal. Why is there such a feeling? Do the guiding principles of doctrine allow us to succeed? Institutionally, are we capturing the successes or focusing too much on the arguments berating doctrine?

In the current operating environment, there have been many significant gains made at the tactical level (Brigade and below). The Army itself has begun the process of reviewing its doctrine through the publication of new FMs (notably the release of FM 3.24, and FM 3.0). Army Training doctrine provides the ability to generate forces (a Title X responsibility) for operations abroad. Operational Doctrine and Campaign Planning are applied to Joint Operations within a given theater. With the exception of key doctrinal manuals that are focused on operations within the current theaters, has the military truly gone away from Air Land Battle Doctrine that was developed in the 1980's and 1990's? As Army and Joint Doctrine have developed, who has the correct interpretation? Are these changes reflected doctrinally or do they manifest as innovations in the field?

To truly explore these questions it is imperative to understand where modern doctrine has evolved. Though classical writers and ideas cannot be forgotten, they serve only as a backdrop to modern doctrine evolution. Major changes began to evolve modern doctrine starting at the close of Vietnam. This monograph will explore the histories of the evolution by exploring the literature that captured these events. The focus of this monograph will not only explore the history of modern doctrinal evolution, but also reference and study how doctrine is currently formulated. The author will rely on modern theories outside the military, such as the complexity theory, and ideas of organizational change. Finally, the author will explore how doctrine is used in the professional military education system. The goal in the end is to determine if there are gaps in

modern doctrine and counterinsurgency operations and if these gaps are detrimental to the current fight.

The research to find these gaps begins with a process trace of doctrine from 1976 to the present, starting with the advent of Active Defense, its evolutions to Air Land Battle, and the impacts of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. By following the evolution of the doctrinal process, the author will form a baseline in which to survey current serving Army officers. Using the guiding principles of doctrine, these officers will answer a series of questions about their experiences in current operations to determine if current practices are doctrinal or not. If not, should these practices be doctrinal? Finally, the author will compare these answers to the baseline that was established during the process trace, and identify the gaps, if any, and their impacts within doctrine.

The result will be recommendations on how doctrine should evolve in the future. On the other hand, these recommendations could determine that the evolution process is working, and allowing for adaptability and evolution within both the Army and the joint community. If gaps are identified, the resulting recommendations may not be straightforward solutions that can be quickly implemented. As will be discussed, intellectual debate lies at the heart of doctrine. If the debate is stifled, doctrine will not evolve or respond to changes that the military faces. Doctrine cannot only be a guide for military leaders, but must also remain a living, breathing, and changing work that is constantly challenged, theorized, and tested. Military leaders must look at history and their surroundings, and test these ideas against doctrine in order for the doctrine to remain relevant.

Chapter 1 Literature Review

The debate of the relevance of doctrine and its ability to influence and assist the military has been ongoing since the days of Clausewitz. The applicability and relevance of doctrine within the US military has evolved dramatically since 1976 when General William DePuy began his extensive review. In order to understand the current underpinnings of doctrine and their relevance to combat operations today, it is essential to review the evolution of doctrine. Historians credit the

beginning of American Doctrine with Von Stueben during the American Revolution, who wrote *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States*. His manual focused on musketry and drill. Up through the Civil War, no military publication governed doctrine or tactics. During the Civil War, many leaders relied on writings from the Napoleonic Wars to gain insight, ideas, and guiding principles. In 1905, the US Army published its first Field and Service Regulation. This manual focused on training principles and tactical solutions. The Field Service Regulation had few changes up through 1941 with the exception of emphasizing increased firepower or the introduction of new technologies. True insights, theories, and applications did not emerge until just prior to World War II when the United States was faced with imminent hostilities. After the Korean War, the Field Service Regulation was modified again in order to introduce the idea of the nuclear battlefield. The next major innovation occurred in the middle of the Cold War. Starting in the 1960s, US Army Doctrine began to evolve rapidly due to threats and technology. This evolution continued through the 1980s when the next evolution in doctrine occurred with the inception of the Gold-Waters Nichols Act of 1986.¹

In order to understand these evolutions it is best to categorize them into several subsections. The first period will encompass the innovations initiated in the 1970s with TRADOC. This period ended with the publication of the 1976 FM 100-5. The second period from 1976 through the mid 1980s is marked by technological innovation and the evolution of national strategy. The final significant period occurred after the adoption of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986.

¹ Flynn, Michael J. *A Common Understanding of Conflict: The Doctrinal Relationship of FM 100-5 (Coordinating Draft) and Joint Doctrine*. Monograph, (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1997.)

A First Step...the 1976 FM 100-5

The year 1970 found the US Army in a desperate state. The shock of the 1968 TET offensive, invasions in Cambodia, the aftermath of Kent State, racial tension, and rampant drug abuse forced Army leaders to evaluate the state of the Army and its role within national strategy. Faced with such challenges, the Army reorganized in the winter of 1971-1972 forming FORSCOM and TRADOC within the continental United States. The goal was to separate the functions of training, equipping, and manning under the two new commands. FORSCOM would have the responsibility of equipping and manning. TRADOC would have charge of all military training, schools, and doctrine writing. This was a sensible move since no training can be accomplished without prescribed fundamental principles to guide it. These fundamental principles would also serve as common ground work for employment.² In fact, JP 1.0 now defines doctrine as the “fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated and integrated action toward a common objective. It promotes a common perspective from which to plan, train, and conduct military operations.”

One leader promoting this reorganization was General William DePuy. It is doubtful that General DePuy believed his assistance in re-organization and return from Vietnam would fundamentally reshape the Army, but because of his experience, he was chosen to lead the new TRADOC organization. DePuy formed his headquarters in the summer of 1973 at FT Monroe, VA. Initially, DePuy focused on revamping the Army’s training programs and incorporating its combat development. This initial focus would soon change in October of 1973.

On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched simultaneous attacks against Israel. The speed at which the two armies moved stunned the world, catching the Israelis off guard during the Yom Kippur holiday. On the end of the first day, both Egypt and Syria had divisions within the

²Herbert, Paul H. *"Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations."* (Leavenworth Papers#16, July 1988). p. 37

heart of Israeli territory and the attack seemed to be in their favor. For the next three weeks, the Arabs and Israelis would fight the fiercest mechanized warfare since World War II. The world watched as American technology and Russian technology were pitted against each other. In the end, the Israelis drove back the invaders, but the total losses of tanks and artillery outnumbered the entire inventory in US Army Europe. Military leaders saw the results of this war having significant impacts on how the US would fight its next conventional war. The Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams directed a complete study be undertaken in order to understand and capture lessons from this current conflict. Fearing that Army bureaucracy would lose the key lessons of this conflict, General DePuy formulated his own conclusions and submitted them to Abrams. DePuy was shocked by the losses. He was concerned about the “new lethality” that had emerged on the modern battlefield. Technology had developed sophisticated Air Defense weapons and guided anti-tank missiles that had neutralized the effects of aircraft and tanks on both sides. DePuy was also impressed with how Third World Nations could so effectively use Soviet tactics and the idea and purchase large groups of its equipment. Knowing that US Army Europe (even with its NATO allies) was severely outnumbered, DePuy postulated that if the United States was to fight against the Soviets or a Soviet “satellite,” the main force must be defeated quickly and violently. He also realized that the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) provided a lethal and effective means to defeat the tank. The only counter to this was combined arms. Finally, General DePuy noted that Soviet trained forces and equipment seemed to be prepared to operate in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical environments. He was deeply concerned that the US Army was not ready for this.³

As General DePuy formalized his thoughts and observations, he realized that the only way change could happen quickly and effectively would be to review, revamp, and in some cases invent doctrine that captured the lessons learned before the US Army was faced with a new

³ Hebert, 26

conventional challenge. By the end of 1974, the Army had completed its analysis and General DePuy had submitted his observations. The four major lessons were the lethality of modern weapons, the use of suppressive tactics, the use of the terrain, and the use of combined arms. Based on these conclusions, General DePuy began to revamp Army doctrine. His goal was that in order to revamp training and combat development, the Army needed a basis of employment in which doctrine could be formed. He knew that the Army must be prepared to win the first battle of the next war, and the Army must focus on the Warsaw Pact. With these guiding principles, General DePuy set TRADOC on the course of rewriting doctrine.⁴

The result became known as “Active Defense.” Knowing that US Army Europe was outnumbered, the writers of the new FM 100-5 OPERATIONS focused on giving Division commanders the latitude to mass forces. They combined maneuver and static defenses and delineated responsibility. By gaining “buy-in” from the forces in the field as well as those charged with combat development, General DePuy was able to produce an encompassing manual that focused on the ideas of winning the first battle, focusing on the Warsaw pact, battlefield dynamics, and a combination of maneuver and static forces.⁵

In the end, DePuy’s concepts were controversial, but effective. He was able to re-organize the way the Army thought by producing doctrine that drove procurement, training, and organization. He sparked debate and gained consensus thus increasing knowledge and setting the stage for future evolution. Unfortunately, the ideas of “small wars” or counterinsurgency seemed to be lost in the new manual. General DePuy thought that Vietnam was aberration. He could not visualize the US Army entering such a quagmire in the future.⁶ The result was that the greatest

⁴ Hebert, 37-59

⁵ Romjue, John L, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982*. (Fort Monroe: Historical Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984.f Army Doctrine 1973-1982 , 1984) p. 9

⁶ Hebert, 19

US military doctrinal evolution to date left out the majority of lessons from one of the longest conflicts in US military history.

From Active Defense to Air Land Battle

With the publication of the 1976 FM 100-5, the American Army entered a period of doctrinal debate. Unique to this period was the onslaught of technological advances all taking place within the Cold War context.⁷ The 1980s were a turbulent period with the Army learning how to adapt to an all-volunteer force, implement new technologies, incorporate the idea of tactical nuclear weapons, while facing a numerically superior threat within the European theater.

The formulation of a new doctrine emerged in discussions of FM 100-5. The idea was termed Air Land Battle, taking its name from a chapter in the 1976 version, which discussed use of ground and air forces. Revision began in 1979 on direction of the soon to be Chief of Staff of the Army, General Edward Meyer. General Meyer directed the TRADOC Commander General Don Starry, a key writer in the 1976 edition, that it was time to relook FM 100-5 due to technological and global changes.⁸ Starry knew that one of the shortcomings of the 1976 edition was that it really focused on the “first battle.” General William DePuy thought it was critical for success to win the first battle. General Starry determined it was more important to win a series of battles or campaigns. To do this meant a shift away from technical and tactical writing to an operational focus. It also explicitly stressed the offensive, advocating that the Army must “retain the initiative and disrupt our opponent’s fighting capability in depth with deep attack, effective firepower, and decisive maneuver.” General Starry had presented the concepts of deep attack and extended battlefield the previous year in his article, “Extending the Battlefield”.⁹ This idea was

⁷ Hebert, 37

⁸ Romjue, 31-32

⁹ Davis II, Robert T. OP 27, *The Challenge of Adaptation: The US Army in the Aftermath of Conflict, 1953-2000*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008.), p 63

expressed through the idea of Operational Art that was being taught at the new School of Advanced Military Sciences (SAMS) at FT Leavenworth. Dr. Douglas Skinner best summarizes the basics of Air Land Battle in his Naval War College paper titled Air Land Battle.

“Air Land Battle represents an attempt to achieve a balance between the factors of maneuver and firepower, the mix of nuclear and conventional tactical weapons, high technology and modern concepts of logistics, and finally, though perhaps implicitly, the divisive tendencies naturally present between member states in any coalition.”¹⁰

One example of changes from Active Defense to Air Land Battle was the introduction of the Principles of War. By using history to illustrate many points, the authors begin to bring tenants and principles to the forefront of military thought. The principles introduced in the 1982 edition are objective, offensive, and mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity.¹¹ These fundamental principles would form the basis of doctrine and carry it into the contemporary period. The development of these principles illustrates the validity of studying history, formulating theory and then testing it in practice.

Not only did the authors of Air Land Battle focus on basic principles, but they also realized that mobility and lethality with the Soviet threat would create multi-penetrating forces and the evolution of a non-linear battlefield. This concept then leads to the idea of deep attack, which relies on air power, thus bringing together the idea that air and ground power must be integrated in a highly mobile fight. With these concepts, Air Land Battle seeks to be a “self-evolving idea” that modifies itself as new technologies come online.¹² The result to the Air Land Battle Doctrine is that it has the following focuses:

Corps perspective

¹⁰ Skinner, Douglas W. *Airland Battle Doctrine*. (Professional Paper1, Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1988.) p. 9

¹¹ Skinner, 10

¹² Skinner, 11

Operational art and maneuver warfare
Decentralized execution of mission orders
Integrated battle
Extended battlefield (both in space and time)
Reliance on new technology

These characteristics themselves then express the following four basic principles as found on p. 7-2 of [3] in the 1982 version¹³:

Initiative, the ability to set the terms of battle by action ... *depth*, refers to time, space, and resources ... *agility* means acting faster than the enemy to exploit his weaknesses and disrupt his plans ... *synchronization* combines economy of force and unity of effort so that no effort is wasted ...

As controversial as Air Land Battle Doctrine has been, one cannot help but see how profoundly it has shaped, developed and influenced US Army Doctrine. The idea of integrated operational campaigns with multiple moving parts, integration of sister services, and basic principles and tenants had resounding effects on US Army operations. However, the authors found that most of the real world deployments of the time where contingency operations in low intensity threat environments. These operations did not seem to fit well with the idea of delivering a crushing defeat to a Warsaw pact type army. To their credit, the authors did add three chapters on Joint, Contingency, and Combined operations, but these chapters where added at the end and not emphasized in their doctrinal shift. The key component of the 1986 edition was the idea that there was a relationship between tactical battles and strategic ends. This idea would be fundamental to further development and the introduction of Joint doctrine.

¹³ Skinner, 11

Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986

It is arguable that no action in the evolution of American Military doctrine had a more profound effect than the incorporation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. After the disastrous outcome of the attempted 1981 Iranian Hostage rescue, Congress realized that the only way to standardize operations within the US military was to take legislative action. The goal of this Congressional act was to promote joint inter-service operations. It also dictated Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), which affected service colleges by dictating the amount of joint material that was covered in their respective course. The Goldwater-Nichols Act gave authority to the Joint Staff to produce Joint doctrine. In 1987, the Joint Staff developed two divisions that would shepherd the development. The first was an Operational Plans and Interoperability Division that would ensure interoperability between services. The second was the Joint doctrine Division that would write, publish, and revise the written doctrine. As with earlier descriptions of doctrine, American Joint Doctrine formed the common understanding and fundamental principles of how US military forces would be employed. Immediately following the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols, US Army doctrine entered a short period of intellectual stagnation. This stagnation was the result of the introduction of joint doctrine. Prior to 1986, service components wrote their own doctrine. The individual service doctrine was only constrained by each services parochial view and its US Title X responsibilities. The 1976 FM 100-5 listed the purpose of US Army doctrine was to “winning the land battle.” With the release of FM 100-5 in 1986, no major changes were incorporated, as it would take nine years for the Joint community to develop its doctrine. It would take the Army until 1998 to incorporate the changes.

The 1998 revision of 100-5 incorporated much of Joint doctrine. Fundamental differences centered on the Range of Military Operations and the model of conflict. As Joint doctrine evolved, each service respectively was given the task to develop joint publications that would manage Joint doctrine. The Range of Military Operations described in the 1995 version of JP 3.0 was taken from 1993 version of FM 100-5, which defined military operations in the states of the security environment as war, armed conflict, and peace. Figure 1 shows the range of military

operations across these spectrums. The model of conflict in JP 3.0 is a more complex holistic approach, while the Army model breaks down the operations separately, but does not generalize them.




Figure 1 Range of Military Operations (JP 3.0, p I-8)

As described before, the major threat to US Armed forces in the 1980's was the Soviet Fleet, Air, and Army forces. The 1990s had emerged with new threats such as crime, hunger, and ethnic violence coming to the forefront as primary threats. The Army recognized this and introduced Operations, Other than War (OOTW) in the 1993 publication of FM 100-5. This model was introduced to Joint doctrine in 1995. As Joint and Army doctrine has developed, it has created a symbiotic relationship where internal Army doctrine feeds joint doctrine. Semantic differences in the two manuals may seem confusing, but when reflected upon the differences are minor.

Current and Future Changes

Current and future changes to both joint and Army doctrine will continue to occur. As global conflict changes so must the US military. To prevent reactionary measures, the US military must ensure that it anticipates and predicts threat. Complexity theory teaches us that the

competition and interaction among independent agents within a larger system is necessary for the larger organization to evolve and adapt.¹⁴ Thus, it can be argued that discrepancies between joint and Army doctrine are what allow us to continue to evolve and adapt.

The Army has led the way in the current fight to adapt doctrine. The recent releases of a revised FM 3-24, FM 3.0, and FM 3.07 are the beginning of adaption and change. The question that arises is if the current changes are extremely different from what was before. FM 3.0 *Operations* was published in 2008. Like its predecessor FM 100-5, it was written as the base document to be utilized for all Army Operations. The goal of this FM is to outline those guiding principles that all Army units utilize while planning and conducting operations at all three levels of war. Key to the new FM 3.0 is the ideas of the Continuum of Operations, the spectrum of conflict, and Full Spectrum operations.¹⁵ These ideas recognize that the modern battlefield is a complex environment that shapes and affects the outcome of military operations. Commanders and units must be prepared to operate with and against a wide range of violence or the spectrum of conflict. Critical is the ability to apply the four operations; offensive, defensive, stability operations, and civil support, properly against in the right combination. In the backdrop of the new continuum of operations still lie the principles of war. Though the manual places these in its first appendix, it does not under utilize them. The manual expects the reader understands these

¹⁴ The author from three sources compiles this definition. Dr. John H. Holland of University of Michigan first determined the original definition of Complexity Theory. Dr. Ryan provided further discussion and explanations during the D318 lecture at the School of Advanced Military Sciences. In addition, discussion in *Harnessing Complexity*, by Robert Axelrod and Michael Cohen, shows how Complex Adaptive Systems work within the management of an organization. Further explanation will be provided in the Methodology Chapter.

¹⁵ Full Spectrum operations are defined in FM 3-0 as the Army's Operational Concept. "Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment." FM 3-0, Glossary-7

principals and will appropriately apply them in planning and execution. This theme of understanding continues in the FM 3-24.

FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* has been lauded by many as a long overdue manual. To many of its critics, it is too specific, and too tactical. Upon review, all ideas and actions recommended are nested within doctrine, but the writer expects the reader understands and knows how the manual falls within the doctrinal hierarchy. In the forward MG David Petraeus and LTG Amos specifically state, “A counterinsurgency campaign is, as described in this manual, a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along multiple lines of operations.”¹⁶ This linkage leads back to FM 3-0, and the idea that the complex modern battlefield requires the right combination of operations for execution. Linkage is reinforced throughout the manual. Arguably, there is no change to the base doctrine as it has evolved. If there is no change to the baseline of doctrine as new manuals are written, then how can it be argued that doctrine is not applicable to the current situation?

Chapter 2 Methodology

This monograph uses the process trace methodology in order to follow the evolution of doctrine from the post Korean War period through the present. Andrew Bennett and Alexander George first introduced the process tracing methodology during a MacArthur Foundation Workshop in 1997. The goal of process tracing methodology is to allow the author to generate and analyze data on causal mechanisms, events, expectations, and other intervening variables that link putative causes to observable effects.¹⁷ Bennett and George break this method down into two different approaches. The first approach, “process verification”, tests whether the observed processes among variables in a case match those predicted by previously designated theories. The

¹⁶ US TRADOC *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*. (Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2006.), Forward

¹⁷ Bennett, Andrew, and Alexander L. George. "Process Tracing in Case Study Research." (*MacArthur Foundation Workshop*. Georgetown University, 1997.) p. 5

second approach, “process induction”, involves inductive observation of apparent casual mechanisms and trial and error while rendering these mechanisms as potential hypotheses for future tests. This monograph will use “process induction” as it is most appropriate for the task.

Doctrine evolution is part of the growth of an organization. An organization as large as the military is a complex organization. In order to understand how complex organizations evolve it is important to understand complexity theory. First described by Dr. John H. Holland a complex adaptive system is “dynamic network of many agents (which may represent cells, species, individuals, firms, nations) acting in parallel, constantly acting and reacting to what the other agents are doing. The control of a complex adaptive system tends to be highly dispersed and decentralized. If there is to be any coherent behavior in the system, it has to arise from competition and cooperation among the agents themselves. The overall behavior of the system is the result of a huge number of decisions made every moment by many individual agents.”¹⁸

Holland’s work centered on network and computer analysis but was soon expanded by others in order to understand organizations. In 1975, Todd R. La Porte wrote an article expounding that organized social complexity involves social systems comprised of social groups with conscious purpose. Using this definition the combined forces of the U.S. military are a complex organization comprised of specialized branches with a conscious purpose of training the nation’s forces and winning the nation’s wars. Work by Robert Axelrod and John Cohen, expands this by explaining how the selection process works in relation to an organization and its growth.¹⁹ When applied to the joint military complex, each branch’s specialization and training can be in conflict with the overall organization or joint community in terms of competition for resources and control. This competition when managed properly with established success criteria makes the

¹⁸ Waldrop, M. Mitchell. *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos*. (Simon and Schuster, 1993)

¹⁹ Axelrod, Robert, and Michael Cohen. *Harnessing Complexity*. (New York: Basic Books, 2000.) p.117

overall organization adaptive. How organizations adapt is found in the well established organizational change theory.

Organizational change theory is rooted in the study of organizational development (OD). Organizational development became a field of study in the late 1940's, and it is deeply rooted in the work of social scientists such as Robert Black, Richard Beckhard, and many others who began to study organizations, how they change, and how they adapt.²⁰ This field of study has significantly broadened with globalization, and now many corporate organizations hire OD practitioners to guide how their organization adapts to quickly changing markets and technologies. OD researchers have now determined that as organizations grow or develop they move through five stages. In stage one, the organization anticipates a need for change. When an organization is founded, it is founded on the idea of a need, or anticipated service that it can provide. Stage one does not have to happen at the beginning of an organizations life. The longer the organization is around it can enter stage one of change any time an impending change is anticipated. Stage two is when the OD practitioner develops a relationship with the client. In business terms, this is when management anticipates a change and brings in either an internal or an external practitioner. The practitioner must develop a relationship with all parties (top, middle and lower management) in order to analyze data, and understand the inner workings of the organization. Stage three is a diagnostic phase, when the practitioner watches the inner workings and collects data to determine what needs changed. Stage four is the development of action plans, strategies, and techniques. Finally, in stage five the action plans are implemented, monitored, and adjusted to provide for stabilization after a change has been made to the organization.²¹ This process not only happens in the business and corporate world but in the military.

²⁰ Brown, Donald R., and Don Harvey. *An Experimental Approach to Organization Development*. 7th Edition. Upper Saddle River, (New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006.) p. 9

²¹ Brown and Harvey, 5

If doctrine serves as a guiding force for the military and the way that our military changes, one can see how these stages apply in a military sense. For doctrinal evolution, the anticipation of a change comes through an anticipated threat, restriction, or even an unintended consequence. This can be through presidential or congressional direction, budget constraints, after action reviews, or global actions that are perceived to threaten national security. The military may consult with contractors or utilize internal “specialists” as OD practitioners. No matter which is chosen, a relationship between the field force and the practitioner must be developed. A good example is GEN William DePuy, and the role that has evolved for TRADOC. The way that the diagnostic phase is conducted can be through current analysis, as with the development of FM 3-24 in 2004 thru 2006, capturing what is and what is not working in an on-going conflict²², or by conducting a post analysis like GEN DePuy. Development of actions plans, strategies and techniques is comparative to the current use of interim field manuals and draft pamphlets meant for subordinate organizations to try to test. The final stage is then conducted through implementation and feedback. These practices exist within the United States Army and forge the path of doctrinal development.

As mentioned before this monograph uses the process trace methodology to follow doctrinal development. The introduction of organizational development stages is critical for understanding since it provides a basis outside of the military that is grounded in the research of organizational change. Through the study of complexity theory and the basics organizational change the author was then able to conducted a grounded process trace.

In order to begin a trace of current US military doctrine, it is imperative to establish what doctrine is. JP 1.0 describes doctrine as the “fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated and integrated action toward a common objective. It promotes a

²² This is an assumption by the author based on reading published interviews of GEN Petreaus, and hearing him speak during AMSP FY09

common perspective from which to plan, train, and conduct military operations.”²³ Essentially, doctrine is the framework from which military leaders can depart to implement solutions in planning and, especially actions in the field. If doctrine is the framework that guides actions, then the author must establish how the evolution of doctrine occurs in the US military to determine if there is a gap between current doctrine and field practices. This is done by determining a baseline of doctrinal evolution and gaining an understanding of current doctrine. By doing this, the author can then assess if, there is a gap between current Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN) and current doctrine.

Once a baseline is determined, the author will then conduct a survey of Division and Corps staff officers who served in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and/or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The survey will question officers about what type of orders were received, processed and passed to subordinate units. If these missions are in line with current doctrine, then there is no gap, and the military is operating within a common framework. Doctrine evolution can continue in accordance with the determined evolutionary baseline. If the predominance of these mission or orders were not in line with current doctrine, then there is a gap between current COIN operations and current doctrine. If a gap is determined, then there is not a common framework for which subordinate units can plan or guide current actions and operations, and a new evolutionary baseline must be established in order to create a common framework.

No matter the result of the analysis, it will help form potential products stimulate further discussion, produce further research into doctrine, and potentially guide further evolution of doctrinal. By determining if current operations are linked or not linked to doctrine, a potential proscription can be formed about future doctrinal evolution. Figure 1 (next page) depicts graphically the process trace methodology used by the author. On the left is a chronological

²³ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 1-0 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. (Washington DC: Joint Staff, 2007.) P I-1

timeline. Next, are major combat actions or strategic initiatives in which the US military was involved? In the center are the major doctrines used during each period and conflict. The left side shows major military initiatives started by the military and finally thoughts and observations. As the trace progresses through time, we can see no major doctrinal framework after Air Land Battle of the Future. The author will progress through researching literary writings and historical documents that will validate past doctrinal concepts and establish an evolutionary baseline. Once an evolutionary baseline is established, the author will conduct the survey described previously. The survey results will determine the status of COIN operations versus current doctrine. Finally, by comparing the survey results of current operations against doctrinal evolution, the author can conclude if there is a gap between current COIN operations and current doctrine within the context of historical doctrinal evolutions. This will allow the author to determine if doctrinal change is proceeding in accordance with past shifts, if the military is operating within a common framework, or if changes must be made now to ensure that the military is ready for future warfare.

Doctrines "Process Trace"




Figure 2 Doctrine Process Tracing Methodology

Based on current discussions and editorials combined with the complete process trace of doctrinal evolution, it is the expectation of the author that there is no gap in current doctrine. It is expected that the current officer corps has been directed away from true doctrinal debate and analysis, graduate level thinking and analysis, to a more tactical or technique focused thought process, an undergraduate level thought process.

The goal of this monograph is to determine if there is a gap between doctrine and current field practices for the US military in current counterinsurgency operations. If so, is this gap consistent with the complexity theory that that competition and interaction is necessary among

independent agents of a large organization, or is the gap detrimental to current operations and preventing the military from reaching its full potential in the current conflict? Finally, this monograph will attempt to make further recommendations for future doctrinal development.

Chapter 3- Analysis

Through a thorough review of doctrinal development in Chapter 2, the determination of a baseline or “induction” was made. This induction was that gaps between Joint and Army doctrine allow the US military to be continually adaptive and evolve as the threat evolves. Using the “lens” example of doctrinal development as presented by Dr. James Schneider, we see four steps. The first block, is the overarching reality that we live in, or the current situation of our world. The first input to this block is the threat (what is counter to our nation’s beliefs, values, and interests). Next is the national security policy, then comes economic considerations (what can we afford?), the interests of our allies (those who believe the same as us), the terrain, our history, and the state of technology. All of these form the current reality our military operates within. Each sets boundaries and limits on how the military can operate. Next is the “lens” or theory of how we want to operate. This lens filters the reality and passes it to the next lens, which are the collective aims and goals, and priorities of our nation, our military, and our service. This further filters the reality. After passing through the lenses, the operational concept begins to form, and the output is doctrine. The initial doctrine must then pass through an application window before it becomes reality. Dr. Schneider’s understanding of doctrinal formation remains applicable today. If applied to the evolution of doctrine, we can see which lens influenced doctrine formulation during each time period, and we can then apply the model to current operations.




Figure 3 Formulation of Doctrine by Dr. James J. Schneider, AMSP AY96-97

.In 1976 the reality facing the U.S. was a numerical superior peer competitor with technology that was equal to its own. Witnessing the actions in the Israeli-Arab conflict showed US military leaders that even smaller countries with the right technology could defeat a numerically superior enemy. After years in Vietnam fighting a low threat insurgency, the reality became urgent to counter a threat that might have been technologically equal and numerically superior.

The development of Air Land Battle was an incorporation of collective, aims, and priorities. In some ways, this period of doctrinal evolution was the beginning of the formulation of Joint doctrine. Primarily, the realization that the Army would not fight as a single service and that with the technological advances of the time, it must at least plan to incorporate air power in order to have better effects against the enemy and begin to lay the groundwork for the formulation of Joint doctrine.

The enactment of the Goldwater Nichols act of 1986 was in some ways a continuation of what Air Land Battle started. The ability for the services to interoperate and plan allowed the United States to have a single unified military goal. Here again using Dr. Schneider’s lens we see

that the largest impact on doctrine was from the collective aims and priority lenses. This act not only allowed the nation to have a combined/joint military effort, but also created a hierarchy within the joint military. By allowing each service to keep its internal doctrine, each branch was able to maintain its own lessons learned. By creating the highest form of doctrine from a series of already developed doctrine, it was natural that a gap was created.

The issue of the gap is now a much-debated topic in the present conflict. What is the gap? One must remember that the doctrinal gap is always a matter of perspective. Within the Army, many would argue the gap lies within the missions that some units must execute. For example, artillery units that execute convoy escort missions or serve in roles that have been traditional infantry roles, or the armor battalions that conduct raids and patrols without their tanks. At the joint level, the debate rages over the role, each service must play within the current conflict. The real question is if this is truly the debate. Does doctrine define roles of branches and services?

Determination of Research

In order to understand the idea of where the doctrinal gap might lie in the view of current field grade officers, the author conducted a survey. A diversity of respondents is the result when one surveys field grade officers. With different backgrounds, branches, experiences, service in multi theaters, what is the commonality in which to survey from? The answer is doctrine.

Returning to the inducted baseline, doctrine is a set of guiding ideas, principles that form a common understanding from which military forces can operate and teach from, how does one conduct a survey of doctrine? The answer is to determine the basic or guiding principles of current doctrine. Military history is full of maxims, theories, and principles. From studying the evolution of doctrine, what principles have remained since the most recent evolution of doctrine began? The answer is in the evolutions of the FM 100-5 and JP 3.0. One of the key introductions starting in the 1976 FM 100-5 was the Principles of War. These have been added to, changed, and modified since 1976, but the ideas of guiding fundamentals remain important to US military doctrine. With the development of joint doctrine, these principles were kept, incorporated, and then expanded. In order to determine there is a significant or detrimental gap between Joint and

Army doctrine, there would have to be breakdown between fundamental guiding principles in the two doctrines.

The newest version of JP 1.0 outlines the following traditional principles of war, plus three new ones. The joint publication lists objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity as the historical principles that have been around since the inception of joint doctrine. It also adds the principles of restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy as the “other principles”.²⁴ The manual states that these principles guide war fighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of war, and refers the reader to Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* for further discussion. In Appendix A of JP 3-0, the reader finds the joint definition of each principle.

FM 3.0 (formerly FM 100-5) Appendix A, outlines the Principles of War for the Army as objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. Interestingly, in the opening paragraph of the appendix, the Army defines these principles as the “most important nonphysical factors that affect the conduct of operations” at all levels.²⁵ The discussion continues that principles are not a checklist, nor are they equal, because the situation will demand which principle is more important at the time. In the end, the manual states these principles “summarize the characteristics of successful operations.”

Upon examination of the two doctrinal definitions, one can see that there is not a gap. Joint doctrine sees the principles of restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy are always present. Army doctrine adds them, but does not see them inherent to Army operations. The manual does acknowledge they are present in joint operations. Is such a discrepancy detrimental to the current conflict? The short answer is no. Based on joint and Army doctrine, the last three principles apply to joint operations, but the Army writers did maintain that use and importance of the guiding

²⁴ JP 1.0, I-3

²⁵ US TRADOC. *FM 3-0 Operations*. (Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008) p. A-1

principles, is left to the planner and the commander to determine. In order to determine if the guiding principles of doctrine were used and which were most important in the current conflict, the construction of a survey to pole the current officer corps was important.

Survey Design

FM 3.0 lists four major types of operations that the US Army conducts. These operations are Offense, Defense, Stability Operations, and Civil Support. Each of these is considered one of the overarching operations that can be conducted by the US Army at all unit levels. Of course, at the tactical levels there are forms of all of these operations. Using the military concept of “nesting” or linking subordinate tasks to higher tasks, one can trace each tactical task up to its overarching operation. In order to conduct an effective survey that is relevant to officers surveyed, it is important to ask questions regarding operations for the entire Army. The result used was to survey officers on the type of operations that they executed within their respective theater of operation, no matter the level they operated. If the officer said “yes” to the executing a form of operation (Offense, Defense, Stability operation, or civil support), the survey then asked them to check which Principles of War they felt were used by their higher headquarters, and their own headquarters. The expectation is that the officers surveyed would respond showing first the type of operations that were being executed in the current conflict, and then which overarching principles were being used.

Though the survey is not encompassing of the entire officer corps, it gives a sample representation of how officers feel seven years into the war on terror. No survey is perfect, and this one has several issues. First, is the possibility of the survey population not having a full grasp of what doctrine says of operations? The last formal schooling for the majority of the population was four-five years ago at their respective captain’s career course. Although, having said this, one would expect field grade officers to maintain some working knowledge of Army doctrine. Second, is the possibility that due to a common basis of schooling the use of the principles of war is almost sub-conscious? In other words, the military’s education system has embedded these principles, so conscious consideration is not necessary. Finally, it is possible that the education

system has evolved technical experts who are not focused on theories, but on techniques. This may be true too some branches surveyed, but this should not matter when trying to determine if there is a gap in current doctrine. Survey results should still show all branches have a fundamental understanding of baseline doctrine. Also all operations conducted no matter if strategic, operational, or tactical, should be following all doctrinal principles. If current operations are not following doctrinal principles, but are operating on innovations or deviations from doctrine, then there is a gap in doctrine that must be addressed. However, if current doctrine is correct and being utilized then there is no gap.

Survey Execution

The survey was published and sent out the first week of January 2009. This survey was produced with the assistance of the Command and General Staff College Quality Assurance Office (QAO)²⁶. Utilizing the convenience sampling technique, the survey was conducted electronically using the World Wide Web. The author wishes to caution the reader that the generalizability of the results presented from this study are limited as a random sampling technique was unviable for conducting this research in reasonable time frame. Having said this, there is a rich literature which shows that convenience sampling, while not ideal, does provide workable data for rigorous study. One simply must note approach the results with a bit more circumspect eye.

Respondents had a two-week window in which to answer the questions and submit their answers electronically.²⁷ Of the original population, 54 responded. Of these 54, all were active duty Army Majors, with 53 having combat experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation

²⁶ Appendixes 2 and 3 contain the original survey, and procedures utilized by the author to conduct research.

²⁷ Survey results can be found in Appendix 4.

Enduring Freedom or both.²⁸ Of the 54 respondents, 26 served at the battalion or company level during their last tour. Thirty-five respondents served within a command group (Commander, Executive Officer, Operations officer).²⁹ The largest sub-population of respondents held a career field of Maneuver Fires and Effects, with the largest number being Infantry officers (10).³⁰ In summation, the majority of respondents served at the tactical level with experience being primarily from command or primary staff positions. The first section of the survey asked if the responder had ever conducted offensive operations as defined in FM 3-0. Twenty-eight of fifty-four answered yes. When asked which principles of war were used by their higher headquarters regarding orders they received, the primary principles reported were objective, maneuver, security, and simplicity. When asked which principles were used by their headquarters when issuing orders to subordinate elements, the answer was objective, mass, maneuver, and security.³¹ These answers were in line with doctrine and appropriate principles of war were utilized.

Section two asked how many had participated in defensive operations in accordance with FM 3-0 definition. Surprisingly, only nineteen answered had participated, with twenty-five stating they had not executed defensive operations. The principles of war utilized by their higher headquarters, most felt economy of force, security, and simplicity were used. Those that executed defensive operations, the same principles were utilized when issuing orders to subordinates.

The third section asked if these officers had ever executed or participated in stability operations as defined by FM 3-0. Thirty-four of the respondents note they had. These individuals felt their higher headquarters utilized objective, economy of force, unity of command, security, perseverance, and legitimacy as guiding principles during planning. These officers felt that

²⁸ Appendix 4, Figure A4-1

²⁹ Appendix 4, Figure A4-2

³⁰ Appendix 4, Figure A4-3

³¹ Appendix 4, Figure A4-6

objective; economy of force, unity of command, security, and legitimacy played a major part in their own planning and development.³²

Section four focused on asking officers if they had participated in civil support operations as defined in FM 3-0. Thirty-five of fifty-four related they had not.³³ With ten only reporting participation in civil support operations, it was not feasible to determine the most utilized principles for planning in civil support operations. The low number of officers conducting civil support operations was expected because civil support operations are conducted in support of US authorities and agencies within the United States.³⁴

The closing section of the survey asked officers two questions. The first was if they had ever conducted non-doctrinal missions. Twenty-one answered they had executed non-doctrinal missions during their last tour.³⁵ If the respondent answered yes to this question, the survey then asked them to explain how the mission was non-doctrinal. Of the twenty-one who had executed non-doctrinal missions, sixteen provided some type of explanation. Four respondents questioned if advisor duties were doctrinal. Two respondent's answers were clearly non-doctrinal. The first respondent discussed evacuating US remains on medical evacuation aircraft (MEDEVAC).³⁶ Interestingly, this individual provided further explanation that the US MEDEVAC was the only aircraft equipped in the terrain to conduct this operation. The second response that seemed to be non-doctrinal was the handling of captives from the current conflict. Since the current rules of engagement do not list captured individuals, as enemy prisoners of war (EPW), and they are not civilian detainees the handling of these individuals had to be determined. These two responses are good examples of non-doctrinal missions, however, the final seven reported incidents of non-

³² Appendix 4, Figure A4-7

³³ Appendix 4, Figure A4-10

³⁴ FM 3-0, 3-2

³⁵ Appendix 4, Figure A4-12

³⁶ Appendix 4, Written Responses Excerpts

doctrinal missions provided difficulty. These seven respondents gave examples of missions that were clearly doctrinal. Each respondent described an operation that was doctrinal in nature, or his or her unit was equipped to handle.

The final question of the survey asked respondents if the current operations within OEF and OIF were doctrinal. Respondents had a choice of agreeing strongly, to disagreeing strongly, and each step in between. Thirty-five respondents felt either strongly or somewhat that current operations were doctrinal.³⁷

Analysis of Results

Analysis of these responses leads to the discovery of three potential doctrinal gaps. The first, as hypothesized, was between joint and Army doctrine. The second raises the question if the advisor role is a non-doctrinal mission, and the third was a gap in knowledge of doctrine itself. In search of discovering the one gap, three were found. Upon further examination below, even these initially perceived gaps dissipate under close scrutiny.

Gap between Joint and Army Doctrine

The goal of this monograph was to determine if there was a gap between current Army and joint doctrine. As discussed during Chapter 2, Literature review, a process trace of doctrinal development led to the result that there is a gap between the two. The main purpose of this research was to determine if this gap was detrimental to the current fight. As discussed before, the slight gap in recognition of guiding principles, principles of war for Army doctrine, and principles of operations for joint doctrine, is so minor that it should not hinder execution of operations at any level. The Army even includes the joint principles in its discussion throughout FM 3-0. Based on the survey results, all Army officers surveyed displayed an understanding of both joint and

³⁷ Appendix 4, Figure A4-12

Army operations during stability operations. When receiving and issuing orders and planning stability operations, the joint principles of perseverance and legitimacy were utilized. As both joint and Army doctrine evolves, the ability to conduct stability operations will become critical. As mentioned before, sixteen of twenty-one respondents named operations that they felt were non-doctrinal.³⁸ Seven of these answers were actually doctrinal, based on the respondents answer. Of these seven, three were clearly stability operations in accordance with Field Manual 3-07 (Stability Operations)³⁹. This manual was published in 2008, and exemplifies the first time the Army has written a separate doctrinal manual specifically on stability operations. The fact this manual was out after most respondents executed their missions begins to show how the doctrinal gap widens and narrows as doctrine evolves. As doctrine continues to evolve, the gap or difference between the two will allow for growth, competition and selection of the proper procedures, principles, and evolution. The way ahead for both the joint force and the Army will be critical for senior leadership to determine. The gaps in doctrinal knowledge are not only natural as the Army evolves, but they are actually healthy as they allow for debate and experimentation before doctrine is finalized for the long haul.

Role of the Advisor within Doctrine

The role of the advisor, and who should be an advisor, is one of the most debated topics within the military at this time. Currently, officers and non-commissioned officers serve on Transition teams that train police, military and even local governmental officials.⁴⁰ The role of who serves on these teams continues to cause consternation among the military. One point of the

³⁸ Appendix 4, Figure A4-12

³⁹ USA TRADOC. *FM 3-07 Stability Operations*. (Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008) p 1-5

⁴⁰ Current operations have the following transition teams: Military Transition Team (MiTT), Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), SPTT (Special Police Transition Team), Border Transition Team (BiTT), and National Police Transition Team (NPTT). The names and roles of these teams may have changed since the author's last tour.

current debate is if members of the conventional Army teach foreign internal defense. For years, this job fell to the Special Forces, but as the requirement increased, Special Operations Command (SOCOM) took the lead in the war on terror. The number of available Special Forces was limited. The second debate centered on how to integrate these teams into assigned battle space. With their own chain of command, what kind of relationship does the advisor team have with the on ground maneuver commanders? Finally, there is a current debate on how does serving in an advisor role fit within an individual's natural career progression. Each of these arguments is unique. The question for this research project is how the advisor fits doctrinally. Further, research would be required to determine how it is different training foreign forces; new field manuals address the integration of the advisor team. On the surface, doctrine does not address the issue, but what really does an advisor do? The short answer is that an advisor trains, coaches, mentors, and guides those forces they are advising. For years, the United States Army has trained, coached, mentor and guide both its own forces and foreign allies. Doctrine provides sound guidelines and principles for training. Several manuals outline how to train. The question is are the principles of training our forces any different than training those of a partner nation? The short answer is no. Though conditions and standards may not be equal to that of US forces, the "how" part is not different. All units, foreign or US require training. US training doctrine establish the determination of mission essential task list, or collective unit tasks that are critical for that unit to execute during operations. The process for determining these is actually dictated within US Army doctrine, but the principles followed to determine these could be applied to any unit. An example of this was conducted by 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (2-1 IN) from 2005 to 2006.⁴¹

⁴¹ Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). "A Battalion Task Force in COIN, Stryker TF 2-1." (*CALL Newsletter*, July 2008.)

During its deployment to Iraq, 2-1 Infantry was partnered with an Iraqi Army Brigade. The Brigade was composed of a brigade headquarters and three infantry battalions. Upon entry to its Area of Operations, 2-1 Infantry's Iraqi partner Iraqi battalions were paired with Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) from the US Army Special Forces. These ODAs focused on training Iraqi Infantry platoons. As the Iraqi platoons gained capability and other mission requirements grew, the ODAs departed, leaving 2-1 IN with no one to continue training the Iraqi Army platoons and companies. In conjunction with the assigned Military Transition Teams (MiTTs), 2-1 IN conducted a deliberate planning process to determine what key tasks the Iraqi Army units must have in order to operate on their own. The focus of the planning was to identify not only the key tasks that these units must accomplish, but also the best way to train them. Using the principles of training as outlined in the FM 7-0 (see Figure 4) the MiTTs made Iraqi leaders in charge of their own training, provided a critical task list, resources, and advisors to monitor training. The result was the Transition of Authority for the entire Iraqi Army Brigade by the time 2-1 IN was assigned a new area of Operations.⁴²

Table 2-1. The Army's seven principles of training

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commanders and other leaders are responsible for training. • Noncommissioned officers train individuals, crews, and small teams. • Train as you will fight. • Train to standard. • Train to sustain. • Conduct multiechelon and concurrent training. • Train to develop agile leaders and organizations.
--

Figure 4, FM 7-0, p. 2-1

The example used is one of many found across Iraq. If this is the case, US units can successfully train foreign units by utilizing the deliberate planning process, and the principles of planning as outlined in doctrine. Why do so many officers feel the mission is non-doctrinal? This answer may lie in the third gap.

⁴² Webster, Charles R., interview by Mark Huhtanen. COL, IN, former commander 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, 172nd Stryker Brigade (August 18, 2008)

Knowledge Base Gap

The third identified gap identified in the survey was that of a knowledge gap. As described before, seven of sixteen respondents who stated they had executed non-doctrinal missions described doctrinal missions. Examples that were listed as non-doctrinal missions were such missions as perimeter security, convoy security, securing prisoners, humanitarian support, and the establishment of essential services.⁴³ Clearly, each one of these tasks is supported through doctrine. So why do those surveyed feel their missions were non-doctrinal, when doctrine addresses each of the tasks? The other surprise from the survey was the few number of respondents who said that they participated in defensive operations. As defined by FM 3-0, defensive operations are “Combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations.” (p. Glossary-5). If this is the case, then every forward operating base, combat outpost, and staging area within the current areas of operation are conducting defensive operations. Each one of these positions follows the tenants of defensive operations. These positions are located and equipped to defeat an enemy attack while providing a place to conduct planning, logistical operations, and create conditions favorable for further offensive and stability operations. Again, these individuals all participated in these types of operations, or supported them. So why do so many officers feel that they have not participated in these types of operations?

The initial answer is that they do not understand doctrine at a level that allows them to reach across all spectrums of doctrinally defined operations. If this is the case, where does the gap begin? It is possible that many officers do not understand the flexibility of doctrine. The lack of understanding flexibility should not be misinterpreted as ignorance. The Army uses a three-pillar education system. The first pillar is defined as experience, in other words where an officer and

⁴³ Appendix 4 shows statistical and written responses to the survey. Specific answers to the non-doctrinal mission question can be found on page 64.

leader serves, and gains knowledge and experiences. The second pillar is the professional education system. These are the professional schools that leaders must attend to continue promotion and career progression. The third and final pillar is a leader's individual development. As each leader will gain different experiences throughout his or her assignment, the best the military can do is decide what duty positions a leader must conduct in order to continue with career progression. Obviously, the professional military education system is what can be directly controlled by the military. The respondents represent the corps of officers currently half way through their Intermediate Level Education (ILE). The last level of completed formalized training would have been their respective Captains Career Course.

Of all the branches represented, the largest population of respondents was from the Infantry. In order to review the formalized education process the author reviewed the curriculum and primary course instruction for the Maneuver Captain's Career Course. The following figure was taken from a 2007 brief that outlines the initial blocks of instruction.⁴⁴ Within the first block of instruction, the course attendees receive instruction on the Principles of War and a Doctrinal overview. This is then reinforced through blocks of instruction covering all operations.

⁴⁴ Edwards, Dominick, interview by Mark E. Huhtanen. *MAJ, Maneuver Captains Career Course Instructor* (February 5, 2009).




Figure 5 Introduction phase of Maneuver Captain's Career Course

Using the sampling of the Maneuver Captain's Career Course, doctrine is clearly being presented to Army Captains. If the Captains Career Course provides doctrinal instruction, it again raises the question of where the knowledge gap lies. During the Intermediate Level Education at the Command and General Staff College, doctrine is used as the baseline for all instruction. Army and sister service majors are also given an introduction into joint doctrine, and its link into national strategy and policy.⁴⁵ Based on the sampling of the Maneuver Captain's Career Course and the author's experiences at the Command and General Staff College, the Army is adequately providing doctrine within its formal education. This leaves the knowledge gap within either the self-development pillar of education, or the operational experience.

Analytical Conclusions

To say that current officers do not do enough self-development, would not take into context the wide variety of self-development there is and the current operational tempo. To leave the gap wholly on operational experience would ignore the current operational tempo. In the end,

⁴⁵ The author attended, and graduated ILE in AY-08. This is based upon personal experience within the course.

the gap within our knowledge falls on everyone's shoulders. Current officers must ensure they keep themselves grounded within doctrine, through self-study, application of doctrine through operations, and mentoring of subordinate leaders. In the end, there are gaps in doctrine. Some serve to benefit the force, others may be closed.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Significant advances have been made in doctrine, not only recently within the context of the current war, but also over time. In the quest to determine if the Army has evolved beyond Air Land Battle, the author "re-blued" his understanding of doctrine. To make the bold statement that there is a "gap" between joint and Army doctrine in the current situation would be met with a resounding yes. The importance and relevance of this study is to understand doctrine, its evolution, and its connections.

The gap between joint and Army doctrine is healthy. As explored in this document the implementation of joint doctrine and current Army or service doctrine automatically created a gap. By having service components responsible for portions of joint doctrine it allows the organization to evolve adapt, and produce a common understanding allowing interoperability and a singular focus. To remove this gap, would prevent services from having their own identities, it would prevent healthy competition and create a singular military devoid of innovation and adaptability. To let the gap widen or go unchecked would also have disastrous effects. First, to go would be the strides made under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Interoperability, common understanding, and current organizational structure would suffer. Unchecked procurement of weapon systems would have significant financial impact. Finally, the ability to focus on national strategy and policy would not have a unified effort. In the end, the gap must be maintained. Current organizational structure and the way services write and feed joint doctrine keeps the gap at a necessary and productive distance.

The knowledge gap and the debate over advisors within the Army are alarming. Further research into the Army education system, mentorship program, and doctrinal review process

would be required to determine if this knowledge gap is damaging to the Army in the future. Some lines of debate could be raised about each of these areas, but one must keep in mind the setting and the reality.

Returning to Dr. Schneider's presentation of the formulation of doctrine, it is imperative that we constantly review and update our "reality". Innovations in the field are necessary, but to state that doctrine is wrong, out of date, or not servicing the force requires one to review the current reality, place that reality through the lens of theory, pass it through the lens of collective aims and priorities (ensuring these are understood) and developing an operational concept. Critics are quick to place innovations up against published doctrine without going through this process. If the analytical and theoretical thinking is not done, then measurement is flawed. Measuring current actions against a specific manual is not doctrinal thinking. Here enlies the fatal trap.

During instruction on the Elements of Operational Art, the AMSP class AY XX, debated the relevance of operational art. A long debated doctrinal concept, the relevance of operational art has been contested since the time of Clausewitz, and Jomini. During the in class debates, Dr. Thomas Bruscano, pointed out that primary change in current doctrinal evolution is that there is no identified enemy. Through the doctrinal process trace conducted in this monograph, we see that at the end of the Cold War the military begins to generalize its threat. To generalize the threat and focus on capability reverses the formulation of doctrine.

As outlined in Dr. Schneider's slide, capability is not part of reality that formulates doctrine. Capability is the product of passing reality, of which the threat is part, through the lenses and formulating an operational concept. By using a generic threat and focusing on a specific capability, the military runs the danger of developing a generic doctrine that does not respond to any threat. By not having a specified threat, the reality itself becomes "unreal." Returning to the Formulation Model, a generic threat leads to generic geography, generic allies, generic economics, and potentially generic histories. Those that argue for a capability-based force might say that technologies would make up for the generics, but would the technologies be developed for the right threat? Arguably, there is also a danger of choosing the wrong threat. The

only way to develop the right answer is to return to national strategy and policy and identify the threat or threats, and ensure the evolution focuses on these. When the threat changes, the process starts over. This is a long intellectual process, but even the identification of multiple threats is better than creating a generic threat that is not represented in reality.

In closing, there is a gap between joint and Army doctrine. This gap is healthy for the organization. There is a gap in current understanding of doctrine, and we are all responsible to battle this. We must ensure that our education system stays grounded not only in tactics, but also in doctrine, how it evolves and is utilized. We must mentor our subordinates in the use of doctrine, and when innovations, actions, or operations deviate from doctrine, we explain to them why. Doctrine is living and we must strive to keep it current. We must not change how we formulate it, but keep our reality current and valid. In the end, the debate, the process, and the intellectual work on doctrine are what keep our organization viable, adaptable, and ready to fight and win our nations wars.

APPENDIX 1 The Principles of War

Throughout this monograph, the trace of doctrine led the author to the guiding principles of military operations at all three levels of war. These principles were found in both joint and Army doctrine. The below sampling was taken from JP 3-0, Appendix A, and FM 3-0, Appendix A to provide the reader a comparison of each principles definition from joint and then Army doctrine.

From JP 3-0 (2007), Appendix A

PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONS

SECTION A. PRINCIPLES OF WAR

1. Objective

a. The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal.

b. The purpose of military operations is to achieve the military objectives that support attainment of the overall political goals of the conflict. This frequently involves the destruction of the enemy armed forces' capabilities and their will to fight. The objective of joint operations not involving this destruction might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. JFCs should avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective(s).

c. Additionally, changes to the military objectives may occur because political and military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation, or they may occur because the situation itself changes. **The JFC should anticipate these shifts in political goals necessitating changes in the military objectives.** The changes may be very subtle, but if not made, achievement of the military objectives may no longer support the political goals, legitimacy may be undermined, and force security may be compromised.

2. Offensive

a. The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

b. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to achieve a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war.

c. Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize or re seize the initiative. An offensive spirit must be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations.

3. Mass

a. The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results.

b. To achieve mass is to synchronize and/or integrate appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass often must be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to produce decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

4. Economy of Force

a. The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.

b. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.

5. Maneuver

a. The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.

b. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver — or threaten delivery of — the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus

also protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy.

6. Unity of Command

a. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.

b. Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. During multinational operations and interagency coordination, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort —coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization — the product of successful unified action.

7. Security

a. The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.

b. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, doctrine will enhance security. Risk is inherent in military operations. Application of this principle includes prudent risk management, not undue caution. Protecting the force increases friendly combat power and preserves freedom of action.

8. Surprise

a. The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.

b. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in decision-making, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; OPSEC; and variations in tactics and methods of operation.

9. Simplicity

a. The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.

b. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to success in multinational operations.

SECTION B. OTHER PRINCIPLES

10. Restraint

a. The purpose of restraint is to limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force.

b. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing of the need for security, the conduct of military operations, and the national strategic end state. For example, the exposure of intelligence gathering activities (e.g., interrogation of detainees and prisoners of war) could have significant political and military repercussions and therefore should be conducted with sound judgment. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby damaging the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while potentially enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party.

c. Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure their personnel are properly trained including knowing and understanding ROE and are quickly informed of any changes. Failure to understand and comply with established ROE can result in fratricide, mission failure, and/or national embarrassment. ROE in some operations may be more restrictive and detailed when compared to ROE for large-scale combat in order to address national policy concerns, but should always be consistent with the inherent right of self-defense. ROE should be

unclassified, if possible, and widely disseminated. Restraint is best achieved when ROE issued at the beginning of an operation address most anticipated situations that may arise. ROE should be consistently reviewed and revised as necessary. Additionally, ROE should be carefully scrutinized to ensure the lives and health of military personnel involved in joint operations are not needlessly endangered. In multinational operations, use of force may be influenced by coalition or allied force ROE. Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure an understanding of ROE and influence changes as appropriate. Since the domestic law of some nations may be more restrictive concerning the use of force than permitted under coalition or allied force ROE, commanders must be aware of national restrictions imposed on force participants.

11. Perseverance

a. The purpose of perseverance is to ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state.

b. Prepare for measured, protracted military operations in pursuit of the national strategic end state. Some joint operations may require years to reach the termination criteria. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. The patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives often is a requirement for success. This will frequently involve diplomatic, economic, and informational measures to supplement military efforts.

12. Legitimacy

a. The purpose of legitimacy is to develop and maintain the will necessary to attain the national strategic end state.

b. Legitimacy is based on the legality, morality, and rightness of the actions undertaken. Legitimacy is frequently a decisive element. Interested audiences may include the foreign nations, civil populations in the operational area, and the participating forces.

c. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable. Security actions must be balanced with legitimacy concerns. All

actions must be considered in the light of potentially competing strategic and tactical requirements, and must exhibit fairness in dealing with competing factions where appropriate. Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and fairness in dealing with various factions. Restricting the use of force, restructuring the type of forces employed, and ensuring the disciplined conduct of the forces involved may reinforce legitimacy.

d. Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed upon a local government through the perception of the populace that it governs. Humanitarian and civil military operations help develop a sense of legitimacy for the supported government. Because the populace perceives that the government has genuine authority to govern and uses proper agencies for valid purposes, they consider that government as legitimate. During operations in an area where a legitimate government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them.

From FM 3.0 (Operations) 2008, Appendix A

Principles of War and Operations

The nine principles of war represent the most important nonphysical factors that affect the conduct of operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The Army published its original principles of war after World War I. In the following years, the Army adjusted the original principles modestly as they stood the tests of analysis, experimentation, and practice. The principles of war are not a checklist. While they are considered in all operations, they do not apply in the same way to every situation. Rather, they summarize characteristics of successful operations. Their greatest value lies in the education of the military professional. Applied to the study of past campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements, the principles of war are powerful analysis tools. Joint doctrine adds three principles of operations to the traditional nine principles of war.

OBJECTIVE

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

A-1. The principle of objective drives all military activity. At the operational and tactical levels, objective ensures all actions contribute to the higher commander's end state. When undertaking any mission, commanders should clearly understand the expected outcome and its impact. Combat power is limited; commanders never have enough to address every aspect of the situation. Objectives allow commanders to focus combat power on the most important tasks. Clearly stated objectives also promote individual initiative. These objectives clarify what subordinates need to accomplish by emphasizing the outcome rather than the method. Commanders should avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objectives.

A-2. The purpose of military operations is to accomplish the military objectives that support achieving the conflict's overall political goals. In offensive and defensive operations, this involves destroying the enemy and his will to fight. The objective of stability or civil support operations may be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must contribute to the operation's purpose directly, quickly, and economically. Each tactical operation must contribute to achieving operational and strategic objectives.

A-3. Military leaders cannot dissociate objective from the related joint principles of restraint and legitimacy, particularly in stability operations. The amount of force used to obtain the objective must be prudent and appropriate to strategic aims. Means used to accomplish the military objective must not undermine the local population's willing acceptance of a lawfully constituted government. Without restraint or legitimacy, support for military action deteriorates, and the objective becomes unobtainable.

OFFENSIVE

Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

A-4. As a principle of war, offensive is synonymous with initiative. The surest way to achieve decisive results is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Seizing the initiative dictates

the nature, scope, and tempo of an operation. Seizing the initiative compels an enemy to react. Commanders use initiative to impose their will on an enemy or adversary or to control a situation. Seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative are all essential to maintain the freedom of action necessary to achieve success and exploit vulnerabilities. It helps commanders respond effectively to rapidly changing situations and unexpected developments.

A-5. In combat operations, offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to achieve a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war. Defensive operations shape for offensive operations by economizing forces and creating conditions suitable for counterattacks.

MASS

Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time.

A-6. Commanders mass the effects of combat power in time and space to achieve both destructive and constructive results. Massing in time applies the elements of combat power against multiple decisive points simultaneously. Massing in space concentrates the effects of combat power against a single decisive point. Both can overwhelm opponents or dominate a situation. Commanders select the method that best fits the circumstances. Massed effects overwhelm the entire enemy or adversary force before it can react effectively.

A-7. Army forces can mass lethal and nonlethal effects quickly and across large distances. This does not imply that they accomplish their missions with massed fires alone. Swift and fluid maneuver based on situational understanding complements fires. Often, this combination in a single operation accomplishes what formerly took an entire campaign.

A-8. In combat, commanders mass the effects of combat power against a combination of elements critical to the enemy force to shatter its coherence. Some effects may be concentrated and vulnerable to operations that mass in both time and space. Other effects may be spread throughout depth of the operational area, vulnerable only to massing effects in time.

A-9. Mass applies equally in operations characterized by civil support or stability.

Massing in a stability or civil support operation includes providing the proper forces at the right time and place to alleviate suffering and provide security. Commanders determine priorities among the elements of full spectrum operations and allocate the majority of their available forces to the most important tasks. They focus combat power to produce significant results quickly in specific areas, sequentially if necessary, rather than dispersing capabilities across wide areas and accomplishing less.

ECONOMY OF FORCE

Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.

A-10. Economy of force is the reciprocal of mass. Commanders allocate only the minimum combat power necessary to shaping and sustaining operations so they can mass combat power for the decisive operation. This requires accepting prudent risk. Taking calculated risks is inherent in conflict. Commanders never leave any unit without a purpose. When the time comes to execute, all units should have tasks to perform.

MANEUVER

Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power.

A-11. Maneuver concentrates and disperses combat power to keep the enemy at a disadvantage. It achieves results that would otherwise be more costly. Effective maneuver keeps enemy forces off balance by making them confront new problems and new dangers faster than they can counter them. Army forces gain and preserve freedom of action, reduce vulnerability, and exploit success through maneuver. Maneuver is more than just fire and movement. It includes the dynamic, flexible application of all the elements of combat power. It requires flexibility in thought, plans, and operations. In operations dominated by stability or civil support, commanders use maneuver to interpose Army forces between the population and threats to security and to concentrate capabilities through movement.

UNITY OF COMMAND

For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.

A-12. Applying a force's full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command means that a single commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces toward a common objective. Cooperation may produce coordination, but giving a single commander the required authority is the most effective way to achieve unity of effort.

A-13. The joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational nature of unified action creates situations where the commander does not directly control all organizations in the operational area. In the absence of command authority, commanders cooperate, negotiate, and build consensus to achieve unity of effort.

SECURITY

Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.

A-14. Security protects and preserves combat power. Security results from measures a command takes to protect itself from surprise, interference, sabotage, annoyance, and threat surveillance and reconnaissance. Military deception greatly enhances security.

SURPRISE

Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared.

A-15. Surprise is the reciprocal of security. It is a major contributor to achieving shock. It results from taking actions for which the enemy is unprepared. Surprise is a powerful but temporary combat multiplier. It is not essential to take enemy forces completely unaware; it is only necessary that they become aware too late to react effectively. Factors contributing to surprise include speed, operations security, and asymmetric capabilities.

SIMPLICITY

Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.

A-16. Plans and orders should be simple and direct. Simple plans and clear, concise orders reduce misunderstanding and confusion. The situation determines the degree of simplicity

required. Simple plans executed on time are better than detailed plans executed late. Commanders at all levels weigh potential benefits of a complex concept of operations against the risk that subordinates will fail to understand or follow it. Orders use clearly defined terms and graphics. Doing this conveys specific instructions to subordinates with reduced chances for misinterpretation and confusion.

A-17. Multinational operations put a premium on simplicity. Differences in language, doctrine, and culture complicate them. Simple plans and orders minimize the confusion inherent in this complex environment. The same applies to operations involving interagency and nongovernmental organizations.

ADDITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONS

A-18. In addition to these nine principles, JP 3-0 adds three principles of operations—perseverance, legitimacy, and restraint. Together with the principles of war, these twelve make up the principles of joint operations.

PERSEVERANCE

Ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state.

A-19. Commanders prepare for measured, protracted military operations in pursuit of the desired national strategic end state. Some joint operations may require years to reach the desired end state. Resolving the underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve conditions supporting the end state. The patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives often is a requirement for success. This will frequently involve diplomatic, informational, and economic measures to supplement military efforts. In the end, the will of the American public, as expressed through their elected officials and advised by expert military judgment, determines the duration and size of any military commitment.

A-20. Army forces' endurance and commanders' perseverance are necessary to accomplish long-term missions. A decisive offensive operation may swiftly create conditions for short-term success. However, protracted stability operations, executed simultaneously with defensive and offensive tasks, may be needed to achieve the strategic end state. Commanders

balance their desire to enter the operational area, accomplish the mission quickly, and depart against broader requirements. These include the long-term commitment needed to achieve national goals and objectives.

LEGITIMACY

Develop and maintain the will necessary to attain the national strategic end state.

A-21. For Army forces, legitimacy comes from three important factors. First, the operation or campaign must be conducted under U.S. law. Second, the operation must be conducted according to international laws and treaties recognized by the United States, particularly the law of war. Third, the campaign or operation should develop or reinforce the authority and acceptance for the host-nation government by both the governed and the international community. This last factor is frequently the decisive element.

A-22. Legitimacy is also based on the will of the American people to support the mission. The American people's perception of legitimacy is strengthened if obvious national or humanitarian interests are at stake. Their perception also depends on their assurance that American lives are not being placed at risk needlessly or carelessly.

A-23. Other interested audiences may include foreign nations, civil populations in and near the operational area, and participating multinational forces. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host-nation government, where applicable. Security actions must balance with the need to maintain legitimacy. Commanders must consider all actions potentially competing for strategic and tactical requirements. All actions must exhibit fairness in dealing with competing factions where appropriate. Legitimacy depends on the level of consent to the force and to the host-nation government, the people's expectations, and the force's credibility.

RESTRAINT

Limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force.

A-24. Restraint requires careful and disciplined balancing of security, the conduct of military operations, and the desired strategic end state. Excessive force antagonizes those friendly and neutral parties involved. Hence, it damages the legitimacy of the organization that uses it

while potentially enhancing the legitimacy of any opposing party. The rules of engagement must be carefully matched to the strategic end state and the situation. Commanders at all levels ensure their personnel are properly trained in rules of engagement and quickly informed of any changes. Rules of engagement may vary according to national policy concerns but should always be consistent with the inherent right of self-defense.

A-25. Restraint is best achieved when rules of engagement issued at the beginning of an operation address a range of plausible situations. Commanders should consistently review and revise rules of engagement as necessary. Additionally, commanders should carefully examine them to ensure that the lives and health of Soldiers are not needlessly endangered. National concerns may lead to different rules of engagement for multinational participants;

APPENDIX 2 Definitions of Army Operations

As mentioned before in order to survey a sampling of the present officer corps, the author tried to determine if officers had used the principles of war while conducting operations in the current conflict. FM 3-0 defines full spectrum operations as a combination of four elements—Offense, Defense, Stability and Support, and Civil support. This appendix provides a quick reference to refresh the reader of these definitions.

<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Offensive Operations</i></p> <p>Primary Tasks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Movement to contact • Attack • Exploitation • Pursuit <p>Purposes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dislocate, isolate, disrupt, and destroy enemy forces • Seize key terrain • Deprive the enemy of resources • Develop intelligence • Deceive and divert the enemy • Create a secure environment for stability operations 	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Defensive Operations</i></p> <p>Primary Tasks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mobile defense • Area defense • Retrograde <p>Purposes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deter or defeat enemy offensive operations • Gain time • Achieve economy of force • Retain key terrain • Protect the populace, critical assets, and infrastructure • Develop intelligence
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Stability Operations</i></p> <p>Primary Tasks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil security • Civil control • Restore essential services • Support to governance • Support to economic and infrastructure development <p>Purposes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a secure environment • Secure land areas • Meet the critical needs of the populace • Gain support for host-nation government • Shape the environment for interagency and host-nation success 	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Civil Support Operations</i></p> <p>Primary Tasks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide support in response to disaster or terrorist attack • Support civil law enforcement • Provide other support as required <p>Purposes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Save lives • Restore essential services • Maintain or restore law and order • Protect infrastructure and property • Maintain or restore local government • Shape the environment for interagency success

Figure 3-2 from FM 3-0 (2008) p.3-7

FM 3.0 *Operations* defines:

Offensive Operations as “Combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. They impose the commander’s will on the enemy.” (p. Glossary-10).

Defensive Operations as “Combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations.” (p. Glossary-5).

Stability Operations in accordance with the JP 3-0. This is: “(joint) an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States


in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)” (p. Glossary-13)

Civil support operations in accordance with the JP 1-02. This is: “(joint) Department of Defense support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. (JP 1-02)” (p. Glossary-13).

APPENDIX 3-Survey

A survey was designed and used to determine how current field grade officers who have recently returned from OIF or OEF felt if the missions they executed were doctrinal. The plan was to conduct a survey of sampling ILE students to determine what type of missions were received at their level during OIF/OEF, and what type were passed to subordinate units. By using current published doctrine and questions, that have the survey respondents evaluate the orders received and issued will assist me to determining if the was a “gap” in between current doctrine and on-going missions in the field. Answers were confidential, but demographics of branch, theater of operation, and operational experience where determined. Appendix 3 contains the statistical results of the survey. Below are the desired outcomes of the survey.

Initial Survey End State- Doctrinal Analysis of OIF/OEF



Demographic Information

1. What is your rank?

A. LTC B. MAJ C. CPT D. Warrant Officer

2. What is your component?

A. Active Duty B. Reserve C. National Guard

3. What is your Branch

A. Maneuver Fires and Effects	B. Operations Support	C. Force Sustainment	D. Health Services	E. Special Branches
a. Infantry	a. Signal	a. Transportation	a. Medical Corps	a. Chaplain
b. Armor	b. Telecomm Systems Engineer	b. Ordnance	b. Dental Corps	b. Judge Advocate
c. Aviation	c. Info Systems Management	c. Quartermaster	c. Veterinary Corps	
d. Engineer	d. Military Intelligence	d. Logistician	d. Nurse Corps	
e. Military Police	e. Strategic Intel	e. Adjutant General	e. Medical Specialist	
f. Chemical	f. Foreign Area Officer	f. Human Resources	f. Medical Service	
g. Field Artillery	g. Space Ops	g. Finance		
h. Air Defense Artillery	h. ORSA	h. Comptroller		
i. Special Forces	i. Force Management	i. Acquisition		
j. PSYOP	j. FA52			
k. Civil Affairs	k. FA57			
l. Information Operations	l. FA59			
m. Public Affairs				

(Once A-E is chosen, pull down menu showing the sub-branches appears.)

4. Have you served in OIF or OEF?

A. Yes B. No (If the answer is no the survey proceeds to proceed to Question 9)

4. On your most recent deployment at what level did you work at for the majority of your tour?

A. Battalion or Below B. Brigade C. Division E. CORPs F. Joint Task Force
G. MiTT/BitT/SPTT H. Other (Specify)

5. What was your position for the majority of your last tour?

A. Command Group (Commander, XO, S3, Team leader) B. Primary Staff (S1, S2, S4, G1, G2 or equivalent)
C. Assistant Staff (Asst. S3, Battle Captain, Battle Major, BMO, etc.) D. Special Project Officer
E. Other (Fill in the blank)

Doctrinal Analysis

6. FM 3.0 *Operations* defines Offensive Operations as: “Combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. They impose the commander’s will on the enemy.” (p. Glossary-10). During your time in OIF/OEF did your unit perform offensive operations in accordance with the above definition? YES/ NO*

* If the answer is yes- survey jumps to Question 10 and Question 11 and then returns to Question 7, if the answer is no – survey continues to Question 7

7. FM 3.0 *Operations* defines Defensive Operations as: “Combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations.” (p. Glossary-5). During your time in OIF/OEF did your unit perform defensive operations in accordance with the above definition? YES/ NO*

* If the answer is yes- survey jumps to Question 10 and Question 11 and then returns to Question 8, if the answer is no – survey continues to Question 8

8. FM 3.0 *Operations* defines Stability Operations in accordance with the JP 3-0. This is: “(joint) An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)” (p. Glossary-13). During your time in OIF/OEF did your unit perform civil support operations in accordance with the above definition? YES/ NO*

* If the answer is yes- survey jumps to Question 10 and Question 11 and then returns to Question 9, if the answer is no – survey continues to Question 9

9. FM 3.0 *Operations* defines civil support operations in accordance with the JP 1-02. This is: “(Joint) Department of Defense support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. (JP 1-02)” (p. Glossary-13). During your time in the war on terror did your unit perform civil support operations in accordance with the above definition? YES/ NO*

* If the answer is yes- survey jumps to Question 10 and Question 11 and then returns to Question 12, if the answer is no – survey continues to Question 12

10: Of the missions you answered above did you feel your higher HQs utilized the Principles of War during the planning process, and developing the mission order (FM 3-0, 2008)? (Mark all that apply)

Objective	Offensive	Mass	Economy of Force
Maneuver	Unity of Command	Security	Surprise
Simplicity	Perseverance (Joint)	Legitimacy (Joint)	Restraint (Joint)
None*			

* If none please explain how the mission was doctrinal: FILL IN BLANK

11: Of the missions you answered above did you feel your HQs utilized the Principles of War during the planning process, and developing the mission order (FM 3-0, 2008)? (Mark all that apply)

<input type="checkbox"/>	Objective	<input type="checkbox"/>	Offensive	<input type="checkbox"/>	Mass	<input type="checkbox"/>	Economy of Force
<input type="checkbox"/>	Maneuver	<input type="checkbox"/>	Unity of Command	<input type="checkbox"/>	Security	<input type="checkbox"/>	Surprise
<input type="checkbox"/>	Simplicity	<input type="checkbox"/>	Perseverance (Joint)	<input type="checkbox"/>	Legitimacy (Joint)	<input type="checkbox"/>	Restraint (Joint)
<input type="checkbox"/>	NONE*	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	

*If none please explain how the missions were doctrinal: FILL IN BLANK

12. Did you ever execute non-doctrinal missions? Non-doctrinal missions are defined as those missions which did not adhere to the fundamental principles outlined in Army or Joint doctrine, or the directed employment of a unit in a mission that was not outlined in that units Core Mission Essential Task List, or Deployed Mission Essential Task List. YES/NO*

* If **yes**, survey goes to Question 12a, if **no** survey goes to Question 13.

12a: If you executed missions that you felt were non-doctrinal in accordance with the definition above please describe the mission by stating the task assigned to your unit, and the purpose of the mission given by your higher headquarters. Since this survey is of an unclassified nature please leave out any operational information such as mission name, locations, or key individuals involved.

(Answer is fill in blank. Once respondent is complete survey goes to Question 13)

13. Do you feel that current missions in OIF/OEF are in-line with current Army Doctrine?


1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Neither agree or disagree
4. Somewhat disagree
5. Strongly disagree

APPENDIX 4 OIF/OEF Doctrinal Survey Results

Figure A4-1

Bar Graphs OIF/OEF Doctrinal Survey

What is your rank?



Have you served in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)?





Figure A4-2

Bar Graphs

OIF/OEF Doctrinal Survey

On your most recent deployment at what level did you work at for the majority of your tour?



Which best describes your duty position for the majority of your last tour?





Figure A4-3

Bar Graphs

OIF/OEF Doctinal Survey

What is your Career Branch?



What branch within Maneuver Fires and Effects?





Figure A4-4

Bar Graphs

OIF/OEF Doctinal Survey

What branch within Operations and Support?



What branch within Force Sustainment?





Figure A4-5

Bar Graphs

OIF/OEF Doctinal Survey

What branch within Health Services?



What Special Branch are you?





Figure A4-6

Bar Graphs

OIF/OEF Doctinal Survey

FM 3.0 Operations defines Offensive Operations as: "Combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. They impose the commander's will on the enemy." (p. Glossary-10). During your...



Of the offensive missions you answered on, did you feel your higher HQs utilized the Principles of War during the planning process, and developing the mission order (FM 3-0, 2008)? (Mark all that apply)





Figure A4-7

Bar Graphs

OIF/OEF Doctrinal Survey

Of the offensive missions you answered on did you feel your HQs utilized the Principles of War during the planning process, and developing the mission order (FM 3-0, 2008)? (Mark all that apply)



FM 3.0 Operations defines Defensive Operations as: "Combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations." (p. Glossary-5). During your time in...





Figure A4-8

Bar Graphs

OIF/OEF Doctrinal Survey

Of the defensive missions you answered on, did you feel your higher HQs utilized the Principles of War during the planning process, and developing the mission order (FM 3-0, 2008)? (Mark all that apply)



Of the defensive missions you answered on did you feel your HQs utilized the Principles of War during the planning process, and developing the mission order (FM 3-0, 2008)? (Mark all that apply)





Figure A4-9

Bar Graphs

OIF/OEF Doctrinal Survey

FM 3.0 Operations defines Stability Operations in accordance with the JP 3-0. This is: "(joint) An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other...



Of the stability operation missions you answered on, did you feel your higher HQs utilized the Principles of War during the planning process, and developing the mission order (FM 3-0, 2008)? (Mark all that apply)





Figure A4-10

Bar Graphs

OIF/OEF Doctinal Survey

Of the stability operation missions you answered on did you feel your HQs utilized the Principles of War during the planning process, and developing the mission order (FM 3-0, 2008)? (Mark all that apply)



FM 3.0 Operations defines civil support operations in accordance with the JP 1-02. This is: "(joint) Department of Defense support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. (JP 1-02)"...





Figure A4-11

Bar Graphs

OIF/OEF Doctrinal Survey

Of the civil support missions you answered on, did you feel your higher HQs utilized the Principles of War during the planning process, and developing the mission order (FM 3-0, 2008)? (Mark all that apply)



Of the civil support missions you answered on did you feel your HQs utilized the Principles of War during the planning process, and developing the mission order (FM 3-0, 2008)? (Mark all that apply)





Figure A4-12


Bar Graphs

OIF/OEF Doctrinal Survey

Did you ever execute non-doctrinal missions? Non-doctrinal missions are defined as those missions which did not adhere to the fundamental principles outlined in Army or Joint doctrine, or the directed employment of a unit in a mission that was not...



Do you feel that current missions in OIF/OEF are in-line with Army Doctrine?



Written Response Excerpts

All written responses are on file with the author, and the QAO office of the Command and General Staff College. The following excerpt is the responses to the question,

“If you executed missions that you felt were non-doctrinal in accordance with the definition above please describe the mission by stating the task assigned to your unit, and the purpose of the mission given by your higher headquarters. Since this survey is of an unclassified nature, please leave out any operational information such as mission name, locations, or key individuals involved.”

Text and Paragraph Responses by Question

OIF/OEF Doctrinal Survey

Question: If you executed missions that you felt were non-doctrinal in accordance with the definition above please describe the mission by stating the task assigned to your unit, and the purpose of the mission given by your higher headquarters. Since this...

During OEF-1 we ran a short-term holding facility that held unlawful combatants. At the time our doctrinal tasks only covered FPW, civilian internees, US military prisoner operations, MP support to civil-military operations, humanitarian assistance, and emergency services. Our doctrine didn't cover suspected terrorists whom by definition (Geneva Convention) aren't EPW and by reality aren't simply civilian internees. Sounds like a subtle nuance but holds significant strategic, political and legal considerations; we are still trudging thru that mud pile and suspect the new administration will affect the outcome.

Conventional forces currently have no published doctrine concerning advisor operations. Certain Special Forces FMs were very helpful. The conventional world needs to catch up if general purpose forces are going to be required to conduct missions which are, by doctrine, performed by SOF, OGA, and DOS.

MEDEVAC units conducting recovery of US remains. While this is a non-doctrinal use of Army assets it was required due to no other asset having the capability to achieve the mission (such as recovering US KIA in the mountains with rescue hoists)

Many classified missions pertinent to the JTF objectives.

Advisory team mission never seemed to fall into any significant doctrine that exists

Non-doctrinal missions undertaken by the Task Force can not be discussed at this classification level.

airfield security in order to provide a secure environment

We had to manage the Rewards Program through the C2X (has nothing to do with HUMINT...is an effects based operation), we also had to manage the push to get Iraqi Linguists U.S. citizenship (a State Department task)

Current doctrine, not doctrine as of then.

Convoy security for other nations in Iraq

This may sound silly, but is advising a doctrinal mission? Nevertheless, the specific missions we conducted with our IA counterparts and in conjunction with US forces were largely doctrinal.

IIA/CA, disaster relief (flood, extreme winter support), elections support (with much execution), medical emergency response to a Whooping Cough outbreak, support to DOS counter narcotics operations (a debacle in itself).

My maintenance company was assigned various missions which would normally be given to an infantry or MP unit including route and convoy escort security, security of detainees and EPWs and perimeter security on large sections (3000m) of perimeter on an FOB.

Served in a Sustainment Brigade. We planned, coordinated, managed and provided area and direct support to MND-C and MND-S.

Economic growth and multi-ministerial coordination. MNFI and DEPT State failed to coordinate logistical support to the ISF. Ministry of Trade, Min. of Technology/industry, and Min. of Energy were under DoS for development, however Coalition and ISF commanders had to facilitate these agencies for importation of supplies, parts, and local energy requirements.

MiTT advisor role where we established, planned, and executed host nation unity projects such as kurdish

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Continuation:

lead blanket drives to mixed non-kurdish regions. The operations did not have higher echelon support nor coalition resourcing. It was up to the MiTT to establish and resource through civilian agencies.

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APPENDIX 5 Infantry Captain's Career Course POI

The following is an excerpt from the 2006 Captain's Career course showing the first three blocks of instruction with each class' short title listed.

A0 – Company Science Week

Tactics Instruction – Small Group

- Counseling – First Battle
- Modularity
- HBCT Organization
- SBCT Organization
- IBCT Organization
- Sniper Employment
- Mortar Employment
- Machine Gun Theory
- Surface Danger Zones and Risk Estimate Distances
- Vehicle Capabilities
- Introduction to Troop Leading Procedures
- Analysis of Mission
- Terrain Analysis
- Enemy Analysis
- Civil Considerations
- Own Troops Analysis
- Air Assault Operations
- Airborne Operations
- Company Tactics Entrance Exam
- CALD Quiz 1

CALD Instruction – Large Classroom

- Introduction to the Contemporary Operational Environment

- COE Offense
- COE Defense
- Fires Planning - EFST
- Fires Capabilities
- Fires – CAS
- Fires Effects
- Measures to reduce operational Stress
- Company Casualty Evacuation
- Company Logistics
- Engineer - Obstacle Planning
- Engineer – EMST Planning
- Engineer – SOSRA
- NBC Operations – Decon
- NBC Operations – Smoke
- Military History
- Combined Arms Warfare I
- Combined Arms Warfare II
- Writing – Diagnostic Reading Test
- Writing – Introduction to Counseling
- Writing – Information Processing
- Writing – Summaries
- Writing – Style
- Writing – Correctness
- Writing – Clarity
- Writing – Persuasive Writing
- Signal – Company C4

A1- IBCT Company Offense and Defense

Tactics Instruction – Small Group

- Develop Tentative Decisive Point
- Develop Commander's Intent
- Course of Action Development
- Course of Action Analysis
- Course of Action Comparison
- Course of Action Selection
- Company Defense
- Company Offense
- Direct Fire Planning
- Echelonment of Fires
- Engagement Area Development
- Breach
- A1 Quiz 1
- A1 Quiz 2
- Historical Vignette 1
- Historical Vignette 2
- Tactical Decision Exercise 1
- Tactical Decision Exercise 2
- TEWT – Bush Hill

A2 – HBCT Company Defense

Tactics Instruction – Small Group

- HBCT Company Organization
- Company Team Defense

- Company Team Defense Procedures
- Engagement Area Development
- Direct Fire Planning
- Modular Sapper Company
- Weapons Positioning
- Counter-mobility
- A2 Quiz 1
- A2 Quiz 2
- Historical Vignette 1
- Historical Vignette 2

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